spotlight europe 2008/07, June 2008: Hello Neighbours! A new EU policy from Morrocco to Azerbaijan by Fritz-Vannahme, Joachim et al.
 
s
p
o
t
l
i
g
h
t
 
e
u
r
o
p
e
 
#
 
2
0
0
8
/
0
7
 
spotlight europe  
# 2008/07 – June 2008 
Hello Neighbour! 
A new EU policy from 
Morrocco to Azerbaijan 
 
Joachim Fritz-Vannahme, Armando García Schmidt,  
Margarethe Gawelek, Christian Peter Hanelt, Cornelius Ochmann 
Bertelsmann Stiftung, ENP-Team@bertelsmann.de
The European Neighbourhood Policy seeks to have a formative influence 
on the geopolitical area around the EU, as does the new Mediterranean 
Union – which, in the rather clumsy language used in Brussels, is now 
called “Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean.” Nicolas Sarkozy 
will officially unveil the plans for the new Union on 13 July. This presents 
an opportunity to change the nature of the EU’s relationship with the 
whole of its immediate neighbourhood. 
 
The European Union is fundamentally in-
terested in a wide-ranging exchange of 
views with its numerous neighbours. This 
is not only a question of democratic 
change and stability in the immediate vi-
cinity of the Union, but of very specific 
European interests. The agenda includes 
 
•  Asylum and migration policy: Of the 
238,000 people who applied for asylum in 
the EU in 2005, only a small proportion 
came from states in the immediate 
neighbourhood such as Georgia or 
Moldova. However, the majority of the 
transit routes from sub-Saharan Africa or 
central Asia pass through neighbouring 
countries. 
 
•  Environmental issues, energy policy: Up 
to 90% of Russian gas and oil supplies go 
through Ukrainian pipelines. 
 
•  Trade: There is considerable economic 
growth in several neighbouring countries. 
Thus states such as Armenia and Tunisia 
have posted more than 6% for 2007, Geor-
gia over 12% and Azerbaijan as much as 
about 25%. 
 
•  Last but not least, the EU has a vested 
interest in finding common approaches to 
the fight against terrorism. 
 
Unlike other global players such as the 
U.S., China or India, the EU is surrounded 
by a wide-ranging circle of neighbours 
who could simply not be more different. 
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From Rabat to Cairo and thence to Baku, 
Kiev and Minsk – the cultural and political 
character of the EU’s 18 immediate 
neighbours is extremely diverse. Further-
more, their interest in relations with the 
EU is often markedly different. It is also 
possible to perceive the influence of other 
regional players such as the Russian Fed-
eration or Iran in the immediate vicinity of 
the EU. 
 
In contrast to the transformation and ac-
cession process experienced by the central 
and eastern European states in the 1990s, 
t h e  p r o s p e c t  o f  E U  m e m b e r s h i p  i s  n o  
longer available as a well-tried nostrum 
which is both seductive and capable of im-
posing discipline. The EU cannot promise 
membership to all of its neighbours – and 
in any case not all of them would be inter-
ested in such an assurance. Thus the EU’s 
relations with its neighbours needs to be 
put on a new, different, and much more 
imaginative footing. 
 
But what procedures should be used? 
Should they be bilateral or regional, or 
should everything be under one roof? And 
what principles should be espoused? 
Should there be a trade area pure and 
simple, a security community, or should 
the emphasis be on common values such 
as human rights and democratization? 
“ENP vision and reality are 
very far apart.” 
Hitherto the EU has deliberately decided 
to avoid coming out in favour of any par-
ticular procedure. What people in Brussels 
certainly deem to be a success has been 
criticized by the Financial Times (5 July 
2007) as being “a mixture of confusion 
and evasion.” Early in 2007 only one in 
five EU citizens had actually heard of what 
is known as the European Neighbourhood 
Policy (ENP). In this regard ENP vision 
and reality are very far apart indeed. 
 
However, in the political arena the initia-
tive on the establishment of a Mediterra-
nean Union launched by French President 
Nicolas Sarkozy has unleashed a debate 
about the thrust of and instruments avail-
able to a newly defined neighbourhood 
policy. Despite the Irish “No” vote on the 
Treaty of Lisbon, hard-headed negotiations 
are in progress between Paris, Brussels, 
Berlin and Warsaw. 
 
I 
Weaknesses of the Current 
ENP Strategy 
As a result of adopting the European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), which was 
developed in 2003, the EU possesses a 
strategy for closer cooperation with those 
neighbouring states which do not share 
the prospect of membership – which is 
why it encompasses neither Turkey nor 
the states of the western Balkans. Fur-
thermore, relations with the Russian Fed-
eration have acquired a unique status 
within a specially created Strategic Part-
nership. The ENP is the political frame-
work within which the EU can establish 
bilateral relations with its immediate 
neighbours and intensify the work of ac-
tion plans based on bilateral agreements. 
 
The EU member states are investing quite 
a lot of money in the common neighbour-
hood policy. In the EU budget for the years 
2007 to 2013 €12 billion have been ear-
marked for this policy area – 32 per cent 
more than in the preceding budgetary pe-
riod. On top of this there are €12 billion 
available from the European Investment 
Bank during the same period – some of 
which will also be going to Russia. 
 
However, in many cases the incentives of-
fered to the EU’s neighbours have had lit-
tle or no effect. Since April 2008 only Mo-
rocco, Ukraine, Moldova and Israel have 
made some progress in their relations with 
the EU. A comprehensive free trade 
agreement is currently being negotiated 
with Ukraine; in the case of the Republic 
of Moldova the existing partnership agree-
ment is due to be expanded; and the Euro- 
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pean Commission is working on a ad-
vanced status for Israel and Morocco. 
 
In the case of neighbouring states such as 
Ukraine or Moldova, which make no secret 
of their membership ambitions, the ENP 
does not meet local expectations. Both 
countries are decidedly unenthusiastic 
about suggestions which are tantamount to 
a permanent alternative to EU member-
ship, and are looking forward to a qualita-
tive upgrading of their relations with the 
EU. 
 
Accession is a contentious issue within the 
EU. Whereas Germany and France con-
tinue to emphasize that the ENP does not 
involve the prospect of membership and 
should be construed as being distinct from 
the EU enlargement process, the new EU 
member states, and Poland in particular, 
argue that the eastern dimension of the 
ENP constitutes the first step to more 
enlargement. They make a clear distinc-
tion between European neighbours and the 
neighbours of Europe. The former should 
“join the club“ in the medium or in the 
long term, the latter (as they see it) should 
not. 
 
 
 
 
 
II 
A Roundabout Way of  
Renewing the ENP? 
On 13 July all 27 EU heads of state and 
government will meet in Paris with the po-
litical leaders of the southern and eastern 
Mediterranean states. The French plans 
were initially rather different, and envis-
aged a Mediterranean Union under French 
leadership, an exclusive club of littoral 
states which excluded all those EU mem-
ber states which do not have a Mediterra-
nean coastline. 
 
T h i s  d i s p l e a s e d  m a n y  o f  t h e  p a r t n e r s  i n  
the EU, and the plan had to be revised. 
There is now no longer any talk of a 
“Mediterranean 
Union.” The 
concept has 
been integrated 
into a new ver-
sion of the Bar-
celona Process, 
which has been 
in existence for 
more than ten 
years. All the 
EU member 
states will now 
play a part in 
the new Union. 
The dispute it-
self may have 
been resolved, 
but the question 
of defining the policies which ought in fu-
ture to be pursued has not. 
 
The first task of the newly created “Barce-
lona Process: Union for the Mediterra-
nean” is to upgrade the ageing Barcelona 
Process in political terms. It was actually 
supposed to establish a Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) by the 
year 2010 with the help of a common free 
trade zone: a common area of peace, secu-
rity and prosperity. 
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However, the process quickly lost momen-
tum, for the demands and expectations on 
both sides of the Mediterranean were far 
too dissimilar. Thus the north refused to 
accede to the wishes of the southern coun-
tries for free market access for agricultural 
products, freedom of movement for labour, 
and development aid and technology 
transfer which are not linked to political 
demands such as respect for human rights 
or democratization. Furthermore, the Bar-
celona Process increasingly came under 
fire as a result of the Middle East conflict. 
 
The messages sent out to the EU’s Arab 
neighbours continued to be contradictory. 
Was EU aid designed to make a contribu-
tion to social and economic transforma-
tion? Were democratization projects initi-
ated with government departments and 
non-governmental organizations designed 
to stabilize the Arab regimes, to reform 
them – or indeed to topple them? 
 
Another weakness of the Barcelona Proc-
ess was the fact that the mistrust of south-
ern Mediterranean governments of each 
other made it difficult to promote a spirit 
of regional cooperation. Here in particular 
there was no sense of joint responsibility 
for the Process. The French proposals are 
designed to change all this. 
 
Yet certain objections are already begin-
ning to be raised on the southern rim of 
the Mediterranean. Thus the Libyan leader 
Muammar al-Gaddafi has rejected 
Sarkozy’s Union with the words: “We do 
not belong to Brussels.” 
 
It remains to be seen if, after getting off to 
a difficult start, the Union for the Mediter-
ranean will be able to gain momentum. 
Much would have been achieved if an open 
transmediterranean dialogue and forum 
were to emerge, and if few (though effec-
tive) projects in the areas of education, 
environment, energy and agriculture could 
be implemented in a transparent manner. 
 
 
 
III 
A Union for the Black Sea? 
However, the initiative for an improve-
ment of relations with the Mediterranean 
states has already had one noticeable ef-
fect. This is the fact that the question of 
rethinking the way in which the EU deals 
with its immediate neighbours, an issue 
which has existed in latent form for a 
number of years, has arrived in the politi-
cal sphere and is now being discussed 
quite openly. In addition to the Mediterra-
nean, the Black Sea area and the EU’s 
eastern neighbours are at the centre of 
new initiatives. 
 
As far as the European Union is con-
cerned, the Black Sea region is on the one 
hand a bottleneck for energy supplies, and 
on the other the focal point of a number of 
different cultures and zones of influence. 
Conflicts which have been put on ice and 
difficult transformation processes are 
characteristic of parts of the region. In 
contrast to the southern Mediterranean 
states, a large part of the Black Sea region 
is European in character. 
 
Ten states are generally considered to be-
long to the Black Sea region in the wider 
sense: the three EU member states Bul-
garia, Greece and Romania, the three large 
littoral states Russia, Turkey and Ukraine, 
the three southern Caucasian states Ar-
menia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, and the 
small state of Moldova. 
 
Apart from the EU member states and ac-
cession candidates there are two clearly 
distinct groups. On the one hand there are 
Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova, which, at 
least in rhetorical terms, have embarked 
on reforms and have membership aspira-
tions. However, a broad societal and politi-
cal consensus for what amounts to Euro-
peanization exists only in Georgia and 
Moldova. Armenia and Azerbaijan are in-
tegrated into the ENP, albeit sceptical 
about espousing Europeanization. 
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The diverse nature of the region and the 
dissimilar ambitions of the individual 
states are reflected in the traditional EU 
approach to the Black Sea area. A distinc-
tion needs to be made between three dif-
ferent policies, even though each of them 
favours a bilateral approach. Turkey, as an 
accession candidate, is covered by the 
EU’s enlargement policy. Negotiations 
concerning the form and content of a stra-
tegic partnership with Russia are cur-
rently under way. The other littoral states 
(insofar as they are not members of the 
EU) are covered by the ENP and its bilat-
eral action plans. 
Black Sea Synergy, which was officially 
inaugurated at a ministerial meeting in 
Kiev in February 2008, is the first EU ini-
tiative to look at the region as a whole and 
incorporates both Russia and Turkey in 
their capacity as regional powers. The goal 
of Black Sea Synergy is to strengthen re-
gional cooperation both within the region 
and between the region and the EU. Its 
task is to improve the coordination be-
tween common elements of the bilateral 
ENP action plans, though it does 
not seek to turn them into a mul-
tilateral network. 
 
Whereas reactions to the initia-
tive of the French president and 
the proposed foundation of a Un-
ion for the Mediterranean were 
initially not forthcoming in the 
region itself, there was a clearly 
discernible increase in activity 
in Brussels. On 23 April 2008 
the MEPs Hannes Swoboda and 
Jan Marinus Wiersma issued a 
joint call for a Union for the 
Black Sea which takes its bear-
ings from the model of the Union 
for the Mediterranean. The Euro-
pean Parliament is already dis-
cussing the proposals – it has 
been referred to in the draft re-
ports by Jacek Saryusz-Wolski on 
the Council’s annual report on 
the Common Foreign and Secu-
rity Policy, and by Elmar Brok on 
the European Commission’s 
Strategy Paper on Enlargement. 
 
The MEPs call for deeper rela-
tions with the Black Sea states 
which should go a great deal fur-
ther than the existing ap-
proaches and offer a framework 
for closer multilateral coopera-
tion. They suggest that solution 
strategies for the environment, 
migration and security issues 
should be jointly devised and imple-
mented. Such a Union for the Black Sea 
would be managed by a flexible institu-
tional structure. The prospect of EU mem- 
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bership for states with European ambitions 
should be maintained in order to 
strengthen the trend towards Europeaniza-
tion in the region. 
 
The MEPs believe that it is absolutely es-
sential to incorporate Russia and Turkey 
o n  a n  e q u a l  f o o t i n g .  A s  p a r t  o f  b o t h  t h e  
Union for the Mediterranean and the Un-
ion for the Black Sea Turkey would have a 
central role to play. This would give it a 
hitherto non-existent opportunity to influ-
ence the shape of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy. Some Turkish 
commentators consider the idea to be of 
interest. 
 
IV 
And What About the East? 
The proposed “Union for the Mediterra-
nean” caused the greatest stir among the 
new member states of the EU, and not 
among the Mediterranean littoral states. In 
Poland and Lithuania in particular, which, 
since joining the EU, have repeatedly em-
phasized the eastern dimension of the 
European Neighbourhood Policy, the view 
quickly spread that the proposals could 
impede the nascent eastern policy of the 
EU. 
 
The Swedish-Polish Eastern Partnership 
initiative presented at the meeting of the 
EU foreign ministers in Brussels on 26 
May 2008 is concerned to draw eastern 
neighbours more closely towards the EU. It 
seeks to include Ukraine, Moldova and, 
when the time is ripe, Belarus, and the 
Caucasian countries Georgia, Armenia and 
Azerbaijan. 
 
The Polish interests in particular are easy 
to understand – closer cooperation, so the 
thinking goes, will make energy supplies 
from the region far more predictable. Fur-
thermore, the Polish government has suc-
ceeded in persuading Swedish diplomats 
to support the idea of an Eastern European 
Union and thus to overcome the threat of 
division between old and new member 
states. The matter was clinched when the 
Polish government helped to convince 
Lithuania to give up its opposition to the 
EU mandate for negotiations with Russia. 
On 26 May the EU foreign ministers ac-
cepted the Polish proposals for an “Eastern 
Partnership.” 
 
What the Polish-Swedish proposals for an 
“Eastern Partnership” will look like in 
practice remains to be seen. On 20 June 
the European Council called on the Com-
mission to present proposals on how to 
deal with the modalities of the “eastern 
partnership” by the time of the spring 
summit in 2009.  In any case this initia-
tive is of more use to Ukraine and other 
neighbouring states to the east than unre-
alistic demands for early membership of 
the EU. 
 
V 
Four orientation points 
The debate about new ways of interacting 
with the EU’s immediate neighbours, 
which was set in motion by Nicolas 
Sarkozy’s initiative, is now in full swing. It 
will be one of the tasks of the French EU 
Presidency and then of the ensuing Czech 
EU Presidency to promote the develop-
ment of a comprehensive EU neighbour-
hood concept that is capable of dealing 
with the challenges of the future. At the 
meeting on 20 June 2008 the Council gave 
its assent to the proposals, and both the 
“Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediter-
ranean” and the “Eastern Partnership” 
have been included in its conclusions. 
 
The new regional concepts could certainly 
be a success. If they were to receive a 
light-weight institutional framework and 
the appropriate instruments, they could 
bring about what the ENP has hitherto 
failed to achieve. 
 
However, before the new concepts can be 
implemented, European policymakers will 
have to grapple with and resolve four 
questions. If they do not, the current de- 
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bate will once again produce nothing but 
patchwork – new Unions, institutions, 
processes, instruments, and plans. Their 
differing goals will continue to be contra-
dictory.  
 
First. The advantages of the ENP should 
not be overlooked. New multilateral in-
struments should not impede or overlap 
bilateral EU relations with individual 
states, especially with those who can and 
want to make progress more quickly in the 
area of reform. In the absence of the pros-
pect of membership, the EU lacks the cen-
tral instrument of positive conditionality. 
What forms of conditionality can the EU 
utilize in order to keep up the pressure to 
adapt to European norms? Regional initia-
tives set up with undue haste cannot com-
pensate for this deficiency. 
 
Second. The EU must have a clear idea of 
what it is actually prepared to contribute 
in its relations with the various regions. 
Thus with regard to the Mediterranean it 
would have to resolve the issue of opening 
the European market for agricultural 
products from the Mediterranean littoral 
states. This would make a practical and ef-
fective contribution to the stabilization 
and development of many neighbouring 
countries. It would be of some importance 
to discuss educational projects and spe-
cific migration agreements. Georgia and 
Ukraine need to know to what extent the 
EU will represent their interests when 
dealing with Russia, which is inclined to 
intervene in their internal affairs. 
 
Third. The initiatives for closer coopera-
tion with the Mediterranean states, with 
the EU’s eastern neighbours and perhaps 
with the Black Sea littoral states can only 
be successful if they are part and parcel of 
the EU community process. Regional ini-
tiatives can only make sense and be ad-
vantageous to the neighbouring states and 
the EU if all the EU member states are 
jointly responsible for them. Regional 
groups and those seeking to influence non-
EU countries, especially when they are 
under the control of certain EU member 
states acting without reference to the oth-
ers, could easily lead the Union from one 
existential crisis to the next. The whole 
idea of a common foreign policy would 
turn out to have been a miserable failure 
on the EU’s own doorstep. 
 
Fourth. Russia and Turkey must be per-
suaded to play an active role. Regional ini-
tiatives will only make sense if from the 
very beginning the two important actors to 
the east and the southeast of the Union 
form part of the various concepts on an 
equal footing – this applies to Russia with 
regard to the Eastern Partnership, to Tur-
key with regard to the Union for the Medi-
terranean, and to both in the case of a 
Black Sea initiative which transcends the 
current Black Sea Synergy.  
 
In this way Russia and Turkey, acting in 
concert with the EU and other partners in 
the various regions, could help to define 
both goals and strategy. At the same time 
the EU would know that these two actors 
were participating in regional cooperation 
networks.  
“Coherence as guiding 
principle” 
However, the basic precondition for unre-
stricted participation is the unambiguous 
recognition of the sovereignty of all the 
states involved. Thus a Russian policy of 
this kind towards Ukraine and Georgia 
must be in place when cooperation begins, 
and not when it is completed. Similarly, 
Turkey will have to redefine its policy to-
wards the Armenian-Azerbajani conflict 
and come out in favour of constructive 
conflict resolution. 
 
Coherence will be the guiding principle of 
a new neighbourhood policy. This does not 
necessarily imply a single and self-
contained form. However, debates about 
definition, spaces and time frames should 
finally be a thing of the past. Positive re-
sults in one region with one neighbour 
will quickly rub off on other partners else-
where.  
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